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Abstract:  We  investigate  the  role  of  affect  and  deliberation  on  social  preferences.  In  our 
laboratory experiment subjects decide on a series of mini Dictator games while they are under 
varying degrees of cognitive load. The cognitive load is intended to decrease deliberation and 
therefore enhance the influence of affect on behavior. In each game subjects have two options: 
they can decide between a fair or an unfair allocation. We find that subjects in a high-load 
condition are more generous - they more often choose the fair allocation than subjects in a 
low-load  condition.  The  series  of  mini  Dictator  games  also  allows  us  to  investigate  how 
subjects react to the games’ varying levels of advantageous inequality. Low-load subjects 
react  considerably  more  to  the  degree  of  advantageous  inequality.  Our  results  therefore 
underscore the importance of affect for basic altruistic behavior and deliberation in adjusting 




Keywords: social preferences, cognitive load, affect and emotion, lab experiment 
JEL-codes: C91; D03;  
                                                           
* Acknowledgments: Jonathan F. Schulz and Christian Thöni gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Richard 
Büchner  Stiftung.  Urs  Fischbacher  and  Verena  Utikal  greatfully  acknowledge  financial  support  from  the  Center  of 
Psychoeconomics at the University of Konstanz. We thank Marco Piovesan and participants at the Thurgau Experimental 
Economics Meeting 2011 and the IAREP/SABE//ICABEEP conference 2011 for valuables comments. 
 
* University of St.Gallen, Varnbüelstrasse 14, 9000 St.Gallen, Switzerland. (jonathan.schulz@unisg.ch) 
† University of Konstanz, PO Box D 131, 78457 Konstanz, Germany and Thurgau Institute of Economics, 
Hauptstrasse 90, 8280 Kreuzlingen, Switzerland. (urs.fischbacher@uni-konstanz.de) 
‡ University of St.Gallen, Varnbüelstrasse 14, 9000 St.Gallen, Switzerland. (christian.thoeni@unisg.ch) 
§ University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. Lange Gasse 20, 90403 Nürnberg, Germany. (verena.utikal@wiso.uni-
erlangen.de) 2 
 
In 2010 David Freer risked his life to save a stranger drowning in sea. When asked 
about the incident he replied: “For split a second, I thought, ‘do I really want to risk stranding 
both of us?’ Then instinct just kicked in.”
1 Most theories in economics are cognitive in nature 
and  view  behavior  as  a  deliberate  act  based  on  a  thorough  assessment  of  all  possible 
contingencies. However, most people would agree with David Freer that affect and emotions 
do influence behavior - particularly in a social context. 
To incorporate the role of affect, a two-system framework of the decision process has 
been proposed in the literature.
2 According to these dual process theories, two different modes 
of cognitive processes govern decisions: One process can be characterized as operating fast, 
automatic, effortless and often emotionally charged. The other process operates slower, in a 
deliberate manner, and demands greater cognitive capacity. Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 
(2007) refer to these two modes as corresponding to affect and deliberation. A number of 
factors,  such  as  situation,  mood,  exhaustion  of  willpower  and  cognitive  load  influences 
whether the cognitive or the affective processes have a greater influence on decision making. 
In our study subjects decide on a version of the Dictator game while they are under 
cognitive load. The additional memory load is intended to decrease cognitive capacity and 
therefore  diminish  deliberation.
3 A s  s u c h ,  d e c i s i o n s  t a k e n  u n d e r  t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  l o a d  are 
governed to a greater extent by the affective system. Originally introduced to study short-term 
memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974), dual-task techniques have been successfully applied to a 
wide range of topics in psychological research. For example, studies show that individuals 
under cognitive load rely to a greater degree on stereotypes (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), exert 
less self-control as measured by the choice between cake and fruit salad (Shiv & Frederokhin, 
1999) or exhibit higher discount rates of future rewards (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003). 
In which direction does the affective system steer other-regarding decisions, when the 
deliberate  system  is  occupied  with  an  additional  cognitive  task?  In  other  words,  is  fair 
behavior  deeply  rooted  in  human’s  affective  system  or  is  it  a  rather  effortful,  cognitive 
process that overrides immediate selfish responses? The behavioral predictions are not clear, 
and existing studies give conflicting answers. 
                                                           
1 See "Father risks his live to save man in sea" (2010). 
2 See for example Stanovich and West (2000), Kahneman (2003), Lieberman (2003), Strack and Deutsch (2004), 
Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2007) and Evans (2008). 
3 Other studies stimulate the affective system. For example, Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2006) prime second movers 
by showing them either a funny or depressing movie. 3 
 
One side of the debate  posits that the deliberate system  inhibits  immediate  selfish 
urges and  guides decisions based on moral and ethical principles. The  affective system - 
evolutionary older and thus more related to animal behavior - is driven by immediate self-
interest. The perspective that moral decisions are the result of a process of reasoning and 
reflection has a long history in philosophy. Like Kant's categorical imperative or the Ten 
Commandments, philosophy and religion offer ways of grounding values. Similarly, among 
evolutionary biologists, scholars have argued that civilization is only a thin veneer hiding 
human's selfish nature. For example, according to Williams (1988), morality is an accidental 
byproduct of human evolution. This view is also reflected in Schopenhauer's (1851) quote 
"Man is at bottom a dreadful wild animal. We know this wild animal only in the tamed state 
called  civilization…"  or  Ghiselin's  (1974)  "Scratch a n  ‘ a l t r u i s t ’  a n d  w a t c h  a  ‘ h y p o c r i t e ’  
bleed.”  In  a  similar  vein,  Moore  and  Loewenstein  (2004)  argue  that  self-interest  is  an 
automatic process, whereas ethical responsibilities operate via controlled processes.
4 
Contrary  to  this  perspective,  de  Waal  (2006)  argues t h a t  h u m a n  m o r a l i t y  i s  m o r e  
fundamental and has evolved from social instincts humans share with other animals. Support 
for this view comes from studies on animal behavior where basic social behavior is observed 
(for an overview, see Preston & de Waal, 2002). Similarly, van Winden (2007) emphasizes 
the importance of emotion in contrast to cognition in the individual enforcement of, as well as 
the compliance with, norms like fairness. According to the social intuitionist approach of 
Haidt (2001), moral decisions are the result of quick, automatic heuristics. His considerations 
are based on the observation that individuals exhibit moral reactions to hypothetical scenarios, 
but have difficulties to reason their views. Empirical support for a specific heuristic - the 
equality heuristic - comes from Güth, Huck, and Müller (2001). Subjects were faced with 
mini-Ultimatum Games (UGs), where only two allocations, a fair and an unfair one, were 
feasible.
5 They find that the fair allocation was chosen more often when it consisted of an 
equal split compared to an "almost-equal split". Their finding is in line with a focal-point 
interpretation: fairness concerns are only triggered, when the focal equal split is feasible. 
  
                                                           
4 See also Rachlin (2002), who views altruism as a self-control problem, and the subsequent discussion in that issue of 
Behavior and the Brain Science. 
5 In a standard UG one player, the Proposer, decides on the distribution of a sum of money. A second player, the Receiver, 
can either accept or reject this proposal. If accepted, the money is divided according to the proposal. If rejected, both players 
obtain a payoff of zero. See Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982). 4 
 
Related Empirical Literature 
The  debate,  whether  altruistic  choice  is  primarily  guided  by  deliberation  or  by 
affective reactions, is far from settled. The existing evidence from neuroscience, response 
times and cognitive load studies is inconclusive. 
Neuroscience  has  investigated  the  neural  correlates o f  t h e  t w o - s y s t e m  t h e o r y .  
Moll et al. (2006) studied charitable donations using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). They find that evolutionary older areas of the brain associated with the affective 
system (mesolimbic reward system) are not only activated when receiving monetary rewards 
but also when giving to charity. However, brain areas associated with deliberation (prefrontal 
cortex) are activated when (i) individuals are opposed to the charitable cause and (ii) the 
decision  to  donate  comes  at  a  cost.  This  suggests  that  the  affective  system  is  not  solely 
governed by material self-interest. The deliberative system on the other hand mediates the 
affective reaction, when it is either in conflict with more abstract moral beliefs or with self-
interest. Related is the fMRI study by Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, and Cohen (2003) 
who study the Ultimatum game. Activation in brain areas associated with the affective part of 
the brain (anterior insula) exhibit a positive correlation with rejection rates of unfair offers. 
Acceptances of unfair offers on the other hand were attributed to the cognitive part of the 
brain (right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). As rejecting an unfair offer comes at a cost, their 
finding  is  further  evidence  that  the  affective  system  did  not  steer  behavior  towards  self-
interest. While these studies report correlations between behavior and brain activity, Knoch, 
Pasqual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, and Fehr (2006) investigate causal effects. They use repetitive 
transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  (rTMS)  to  disrupt t h e  p r e f r o n t a l  c o r t e x .  T h e y  f i n d  t h a t  
subjects are more willing to accept unfair offers, when the right prefrontal cortex is disrupted. 
As  such  their  finding  suggests  that  choices  are  more  likely  to  be  self-regarding,  when 
deliberation is impaired. Comparing these three studies the evidence on the role of affect on 
social preferences is mixed. Closest to our study is Moll et al. (2006). Like their study, our 
experiment is non-strategic. In contrast, however, our research has the advantage that we can 
draw causal inference.
6  
The existing empirical evidence on cognitive load and social preferences is likewise 
inconclusive. Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison, and Dent (2000) find that individuals under 
                                                           
6 See also Rubinstein (2007) and Piovesan and Wengström (2009) on response times and social preferences. The latter find 
longer response times for pro-social choices in a version of a Dictator game. In as far as longer response times reflect more 
cognitive activity, their results suggest that it is deliberation overwriting immediate selfish responses. In a strategic situation 
Rubinstein (2007) finds the opposite. Egoistic decisions of proposers in the Ultimatum game exhibit a longer reaction time. 
An early study on time pressure and helping behavior is Darley and Batson (1973). 5 
 
high cognitive load are more likely to request an equal split from a common resource pool. In 
case  of  an  Ultimatum  Game  Capelletti,  Güth,  and  Ploner (2008)  do  not  find  an  effect  of 
cognitive  load.  Closer  to  our  study  are  the  experiments  by  Hauge,  Brekke,  Johansson, 
Johansson-Stenman,  and  Svedsäter (2009),  Cornelissen,  Dewitte,  and  Warlop (2011)  and 
Benjamin,  Brown,  and  Shapiro (2006).  All  three  studies  focus  on  Dictator  game  giving. 
However, none of the studies finds a main effect of the cognitive load task that consisted of 
memorizing a seven digit-number. Cornelissen et al. (2011) find a treatment difference for a 
subset of individuals - those that were classified as pro-socials in a different task give a higher 
amount in the high-load condition.
7  
To  preclude  strategic  considerations  our  focus  is  on  the  Dictator  games  (DG). 
Compared to previous research on cognitive load and DG, our experimental study comprises 
two main innovations: First, we  apply a different cognitive load task. Hauge et al. (2009) 
suggest that their cognitive load task (seven-digit number) might have been insufficient in 
order to find treatment effects. Our cognitive load, an n-back task (Gevins and Cutillo, 1993), 
is very likely to impose a higher cognitive load than simple tasks like memorizing seven digit 
numbers. In addition to solely memorizing, n-back tasks require monitoring, updating and 
manipulation of information. N-back tasks have been used in functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) studies to investigate the role of 
working memory. They have consistently shown increasing activity of the frontal-cortex (for 
overviews see Owen, McMillan, Laird & Bullmore, 2005; Fletcher & Henson, 2001). Thus, 
our memory load task has been shown to specifically activate those areas in the brain that are 
associated with deliberation. Second, our experiment comprises a series of mini-DGs. This 
allows us (i) to investigate how subjects react to varying incentives posed by different mini-
DGs and (ii) test the equality heuristic. The implementation of a series of games has also a 
methodological purpose. Other studies informed subjects on their whole choice set before 
they were under cognitive load. In principal, subjects in these studies could decide prior to 
being under load. In our experiment we informend subjects only about the general structure of 
the  decision  situation.  The  payoff  structure  of  the p a r t i c u l a r  g a m e  w a s  r e v e a l e d  u n d e r  
cognitive load. Thus, subjects could not choose their strategy prior to being under cognitive 
load. 
                                                           
7 See also the studies by van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, and Ybema (2006) and Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, and 
Chamberlin (2002) which investigate subjects' evaluation of hypothetical scenarios under varying load conditions. 
Van den Bos et al. (2006) report that high-load subjects express a higher level of satisfaction with advantageous inequality, 
while Skitka et al. (2002) find for a subset of subjects (liberals) that they are less willing to help someone in need when they 
are cognitively busy. Related is also the study by Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth and Ghumman (2011). They show that low 
levels of sleep (which is negatively related to self-control resources) is positively related to unethical behavior like cheating. 6 
 
Experimental design and procedures 
Our  experiment  consists  of  two  parallel  tasks.  While  subjects  are  engaged  in  a 
cognitive load task they simultaneously decide on a social task. Our treatment variation is the 
difficulty of the cognitive load task. Subjects are randomized to either a high- or a low-load 
condition. 
Social decision task 
The social decision task consists of a series of 20 mini Dictator games (mini-DGs). In 
each  mini-DG  the  Dictator  decides  on  the  distribution  of  money  between  him  and  an 
anonymous  other.  The  choice  set  is  restricted  to  two  allocations.  One  allocation  always 
exhibits a greater inequality (unfair allocation) than the other (fair allocation). Table 1 lists the 
20 mini-DGs. For example, in Game No. 1 subjects can decide between the allocation 50/50 
on the one hand and 60/40 on the other. 
Apart from the overall effect of cognitive load, this series of mini-DGs allows us to 
investigate  how  individuals  in  the  two  treatment  conditions  react  to  varying  degrees  of 
inequality in the different games. For example, the unfair allocation in the mini-DG with the 
allocations 50/50 and 60/40 (Game No. 1) leads to less inequality (and lower payoff to the 
dictator)  than  in  the  game  with  50/50  and  80/20  (Game  No.  9):  in  the  former  game  the 
receiver gets twenty points less than the dictator, whereas in the latter it is 60 points. We 
hypothesize that low-load individuals are more responsive to the different incentives posed as 
they have more cognitive resources to evaluate each single game. 
For every mini-DG with an equal split we included an additional one with an "almost-
equal split" slightly favoring the Dictator. This allows us to test the hypothesis that an equal 
split  constitutes  a  focal  point  as  suggested  by  Güth et al. (2001),  Roch et al. (2000),  or 
Messick and Schell (1992). Thus, if the equal split constitutes a decision heuristic, we would 
expect to see a higher percentage of individuals choosing the equal split compared to the 
almost-equal split in otherwise identical mini-DGs. This effect should be exaggerated under 
high cognitive load, as the decisions are less influenced by deliberation. 
To further investigate possible heuristic and as a robustness check each mini-DG has a 
counterpart exhibiting a slightly different pie-size. In particular, ten games exhibit a pie size 
of 100 and ten games a pie size of 94. The relative shares in the respective games are identical 
up to rounding differences. A pie-size of 100 may be more easily accessible than a pie-size of 
94 as the percentage shares and levels coincide in the former case. For example, general 7 
 
linguistic usage denotes an equal split as a fifty-fifty option. In case of a pie-size of 100 the 
equal split corresponds to 50 points each. Therefore, it might constitute a stronger focal point 
than  the  equal  split  of  47 points  each.  A  similar  argument  can  be  made  for  the  other 
allocations. 
To conclude, our experimental design consist of 4 "core-games" with each coming in 
four flavors, that is, each differs along two dimensions: (i) the pie-size and (ii) whether the 
fair allocation constitute an equal split or an almost equal split (Game No. 1 to 16 in table 1). 
We included 2 more core-games that neither exhibit an equal nor almost equal split (Game 
No. 17-20). The only variation within these core-games is the pie-size. On the one hand we 
were interested how behavior is affected when the fair allocation exhibits a greater degree of 
inequality. On the other hand we wanted to introduce more variation in our games so that the 
systematic design of our games does not become too obvious for subjects. 
 




Dictator's share in fair and 
unfair allocation, rounded 
Equal Spilt  Pie Size  Fair Allocation   U n f a i r   A l l o c a t i o n    
   Dictator  Receiver    Dictator  Receiver 
1 
50 - 60 
equal  100  50  50    60  40 
2  94  47  47    56  38 
3  not eq.  100  51  49    60  40 
4  94  48  46    56  38 
5 
50 - 70 
equal  100  50  50    70  30 
6  94  47  47    66  28 
7  not eq.  100  51  49    70  30 
8  94  48  46    66  28 
9 
50 - 80 
equal  100  50  50    80  20 
10  94  47  47    75  19 
11  not eq.  100  51  49    80  20 
12  94  48  46    75  19 
13 
50 - 90 
equal  100  50  50    90  10 
14  94  47  47    85  9 
15  not eq.  100  51  49    90  10 
16  94  48  46    85  9 
17  80 - 90  not eq.  100  80  20    90  10 
18  94  75  19    85  9 
19  60 - 100  not eq.  100  60  40    100  0 
20  94  56  38    94  0 
 
Note: The social decision task consists of a series of 20 binary mini-DGs. Column 2: the game’s varying degree of inequality; 
the first number refers to the (rounded) Dictator’s percentage share in the fair, the second in the unfair allocation. Colum 3: 
for each game with an equal split we included one with an almost equal split. Column 4: for each game with a pie-size of 100 
we included an otherwise identical one with a pie-size of 94. Colum 5: amount of points to the Dictator and Receiver in the 
Fair-Allocation. Colum 6: amount of points to the Dictator and Receiver in the unfair Allocation. 8 
 
Cognitive load task 
Our cognitive load task consists of an n-back task. In our n-back task subjects hear a 
new  letter  over  headphones  every  three  seconds.  In  the  high-load  condition,  subjects  are 
incentivized to press a key every time they hear a letter that resounded two letters before (2-
back condition). In the low-load condition (0-back) subjects had to indicate every time they 
heard  the  letter  “L”.  Altogether  the  sequence  consisted  of  10 different  letters 
(D,F,K,L,N,P,Q,R,S,T) and 25 percent were targets, that is, letters that had to be indicated. 
The letters were recorded in one female and one male voice and sounded in randomized order. 
The sequence was constructed such that in both load conditions the targets occurred at the 
same time. For every correct indication of a target subjects received 0.5 points. If subjects 
indicated  incorrectly,  0.25 points  were  deducted.  Parallel  to  the  cognitive  load  task  they 
completed the social decision task. Jaeggi et al. (2003) have shown that subjects are capable 
of completing two parallel tasks - in their study two 2-back tasks - and perform well above 
chance. 
Procedures 
We conducted 5 sessions with 136 participants in June and July 2010 at the LakeLab 
of the University of Konstanz. Participants were students of the University of Konstanz and 
were  recruited  using  the  online  recruiting  system  ORSEE  (Greiner, 2004).  None  of  the 
subjects participated in more than one session. Each subject sat at a randomly assigned PC 
terminal and was given a copy of instructions (see the appendix for the instructions). The 
experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A set of control questions was 
provided  to  ensure  the  understanding  of  the  game.  The  experiment  did  not  start  until  all 
subjects had answered all questions correctly. In order to ensure the understanding of the n-
back task participants took part in an unpaid practice round for 90 seconds. 
The order of the 20 mini-DGs was randomized. Subjects had 20 seconds to decide in a 
mini-DG followed by a 7 seconds break before a new game started. Parallel to it they took 
part in the cognitive load task. All subjects took decisions as a Dictator. Only at the end of the 
experiment  the  actual  role  of  a  participant  (either D i c t a t o r  o r  R e c e i v e r )  w a s  r a n d o m l y  
determined. Further, only one randomly determined game was paid out. Thus, 50 percent of 
(randomly determined) participants were paid according to their decision in one (randomly 
determined)  mini-DG  as  the  Dictator.  The  other  50 percent  were  Receivers  of  the 
corresponding games. One point of the randomly chosen game translated into 0.22 € . At the 
end of the experiment subjects filled out a socio-economic questionnaire. Average income 9 
 
amounted to about 21 €  (10.5 €  for the social decision task, 4.5 €  for the n-back task, 7 €  for 
show-up and completion of the questionnaire). The experiment including the questionnaire 
lasted about 75 minutes. 
Results 
Our cognitive load treatment is only effective if subjects actually exert effort in our 
n-back task. We find that this is indeed the case: altogether the performance (percentage of 
non-missed targets and no wrong indication) was 97.8, 99.6 percent in the 0-back and 96.0 
percent in the 2-back condition. This suggests that the 2-back task is more demanding, but 
people still complete it well above chance. Taken together these results indicate that subjects 
were successfully put under cognitive load. 
Focusing on the treatment differences we find that subjects in the high-load condition 
are  more  generous  on  average.  They  choose  the  fair  allocation  43.3 percent  of  the  cases 
compared to 30.9 percent in the low-load condition. This treatment difference suggests that 
once the affective system is mediated to a lesser extent by the deliberate system, choices are 
more generous.
8 
Looking at core games reveals interesting heterogeneity in the treatment effect. The 
games vary in their extent of inequality (and hence payoff) of the two allocations. Figure 1 
displays the fraction of fair choices for every core game by cognitive load (bars). Dots show 
the results of the four individual games. In almost every game the fraction of fair choices is 
larger in the high-load condition. Most pronounced are the treatment differences in games 
exhibiting  only  a  small  level  of  inequality.  Wilcoxon  rank-sum  tests  reveal  that  the 
differences are highly significant in the games leaving the Dictator a share of either 60 or 70 
percent in the unfair allocation. 
                                                           
8Altogether, only in 2.6 percent of the cases individuals did not make a choice in the social decision task. In the high-load 
condition this was the case 4.3 percent of the time reflecting that one subjects in the high load condition did not make a 
choice at all. 10 
 
Figure 1: Fraction of fair choices by load and game. The first number on the y-axis refers to the (rounded) Dictator’s share in 
the fair-allocation, the second number to the share in the unfair allocation. Thus, Games with the same (rounded) fraction of 
the unfair allocations are pooled (those that differ only in pie-size and whether or not fair allocation is equal or almost equal 
split). The asterisk denote the significance levels of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, where *** denotes significance at p < 0.01 and 
* significance at p < 0.1. 
 
As it is apparent from Figure 1, individuals in the low-load condition react stronger to 
the incentives posed by the different games. The larger the inequality of the unfair allocation, 
the  more  likely  are  low-load  subjects  to  choose  the f a i r  a l l o c a t i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n l y  
20 percent of low-load subjects decide for the fair allocation when the unfair allocation leaves 
the Receiver 40 percent of the pie. However, 35.7 percent choose the fair allocation, when the 
choice is between the equal split and leaving 10 percent for the Receiver.  
The probit regression in table 2 corroborates these findings. Without controlling for 
the  inequality  of  the  different  allocations,  high-load  subjects  choose  weakly  significantly 
more often the fair allocation (column 1). Conditioning on the degree of inequality reveals 
that  the  two  load  conditions  are  highly  significantly  different:  low-load  subjects  react 
significantly  stronger  to  the  incentives  posed  by  the  inequality  of  the  unfair  allocation 
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(column 2). An increase in the dictator’s share in the unfair allocation by 10 percentage points 
leads to an increase in the probability of a fair choice by 6.6 percentage points. Even though 
high-load subjects react significantly less, an F-test of joint significance reveals that they also 
weakly significantly react to the inequality of the unfair allocation (p=0.087). As a result, 
cognitive load is more effective in situations where the unfair allocation exhibits a relative 
small degree of inequality. Our findings therefore suggest that subjects under low-load on 
average take the situation more fully into account. If the unfair allocation leads to only a small 
degree  of  inequality,  they  behave  in  a  self-interested  way.  However,  in  more  extreme 
instances, in particular when the unfair allocation leaves nothing for the other individual, the 
treatment difference vanishes. 
 

















         












         












         
Equal Option     - 0 . 0 0 7  
(0.02) 
 
(Equal Option) x Load     0 . 0 1 8  
(0.024) 
 
         
Pie-Size 100       -0.016 
(0.017) 
(Pie-Size 100) x Load       0.022 
(0.021) 
         
















N  2650  2650  2650  2650 
Pseudo R
2  0.013  0.024  0.024  0.023 
 
Note: Marginal effects of probit estimation with robust standard errors clustered on subjects in parenthesis. The dependant 
variable is a dummy indicating a fair choice. x denotes interaction terms. 'Fraction Dictator Unfair Allocation' denotes the 
number of points to the Dictator in the unfair allocation. The dummy 'Equal Option' denotes whether the fair allocation is an 
equal split. 'Pie-Size 100' indicates whether the pie-size is 100. 'Fraction Dictator Fair Allocation' denotes the number of 
points to the dictator in the fair allocation. *** Significant at p < 0.01; ** at p < 0.05; * at p < 0.1. 
 12 
 
Equality heuristic & pie size 
In our experiment we do not find evidence for an equality-heuristic. There appears to 
be no systematic differences whether the fair allocation is the equal split or the almost-equal 
split (see table 2 column 3). This is also the case when focusing on high-load subjects only. If 
the equality-heuristic exists, we would expect a more pronounced effect when subjects are 
cognitively busy. However, as Figure 1 and Table 2 (column 3) reveal, high-load subjects are 
also not more likely to choose an equal split over an almost-equal split. This suggests that the 
equal split does not constitute a focal point in our experiment. Compared to the study by 
Güth et al. (2001), our social decision task is non-strategic. In a strategic setting such as the 
Ultimatum  Game  the  equal  split  might  be  an  attractive  choice  due  to  the  (beliefs  about) 
behavior  of  second  movers.  Similarly,  we  do  not  find  an  effect  of  the  different  pie-sizes 
(Table 2, column 4). Thus, whether the actual points coincide with the percentage distribution 
or not seems to have no effect on the outcome. In our regression we also controlled for the 
rank order of a particular mini-DG. As table 2 reveals we do not find a time trend in our data: 
decisions do not systematically vary with the variable 'Period'. 
Individual decisions 
Individuals under high-load are more generous and react less to the incentives posed 
by the different games. Does this simply reflect a higher degree of randomness in subjects' 
decisions? That is, if individuals in the high-load condition are more likely to make random 
decisions, the mean will be closer to the expected random outcome of 0.5.  
To  test  whether  high-load  individuals  exhibit  a  higher  degree  of  randomness  we 
consider individual decisions. A benchmark for consistency has to specify the impact of own 
and the others payoff on utility in a coherent way. In our non-strategic setting outcome based 
models of inequality aversion offer a point of departure. In the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
model  utility  depends  linearly  on  advantageous  inequality.  Therefore,  depending  on  the 
weight individuals put on advantageous inequality (the beta), the model predicts that subjects 
either always choose the fair allocation or always choose the unfair allocation. While it is 
evident to call someone consistent, who either never or always chooses the fair allocation, it is 
implausible  to  define  all  subjects,  who  switch  between  the  fair  and  unfair  allocation  as 
inconsistent. In fact, Fehr-Schmidt are aware that their assumption of linearity is not fully 
realistic - especially in the DG. They acknowledge that a non-negligible fraction of people 
exhibit nonlinear inequality aversion in the domain of advantageous inequality. 13 
 
In the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model utility is nonlinear in inequality aversion. 
Utility  is  convex  in  inequality  and  as  a  result  the m o d e l  e x h i b i t s  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  m a r g i n a l 
sensitivity towards inequality. Thus, in the standard DG it does not restrict optimal choices to 
the equal split or the pure selfish allocation, but supports all allocations in between. What are 
the implications for the mini-DGs? It is straightforward that individuals, who either always or 
never choose the unfair allocation, reveal consistent behavior. For "always-fair" individuals in 
each  binary  game  the  monetary  gain  of  the  unfair  allocation  is  lower  than  the  implied 
(psychological)  loss  due  to  inequality.  Due  to  increasing  marginal  sensitivity  towards 
inequality, someone who chooses 'fair' in the game that includes the unfair allocation with the 
lowest inequality (50/50 vs. 60/40), will also choose 'fair' in all other mini-DGs. 
For  individuals  who  switch  between  fair  and  unfair  allocations,  Bolton-Ockenfels 
gives straightforward predictions if we solely focus on the 16 allocation decisions with an 
equal (and almost-equal) split.
9 Restricting the analysis to these 16 games allows us to focus 
on the varying degree of inequality of the unfair allocation: at a certain threshold - as the 
inequality  of  the  unfair  allocation  increases  -  individuals  previously  choosing  the  unfair 
allocation switch to the fair allocation. Up to the threshold the monetary gain dominates the 
(psychological) losses from inequality. Past the threshold, as inequality increases, inequality 
aversion dominates the monetary gains (in an unrestricted choice set their DG choice would 
lie somewhere close to this threshold). 
The increasing marginal sensitivity towards inequality of Bolton-Ockenfels implies 
this  pattern  where  individuals  switch  from  the  unfair  allocation  to  the  fair  allocation  as 
inequality gets larger. However, it also seems plausible that individuals exhibit decreasing 
marginal  sensitivity,  that  is,  subjects  consistently  switching  from  the  fair  to  the  unfair 
allocation as inequality gets larger. We therefore included this possibility in our analysis. 
  
                                                           
9 For our consistency-measure we only focus on the degree of inequality of the unfair allocation. That is we neglect 
differences in the fair allocation stemming from equal split and almost equal split. Additionally, we focus only on the relative 
distribution of the advantageous allocation, that is, we neglect the minor differences stemming from the two different pie-
sizes. Incorporating these differences does not lead to any qualitative changes of the results. 14 
 
Table 3: Number of subjects by (consistent) strategies and treatment condition (in the 16 games with equal or 
almost equal split). 
  Number of Subjects Low-
Load 
Number of Subjects High-
Load 
Always Fair  4  (5.9%)  12  (17.9%) 
Never Fair  33  (48.5%)  27  (41.8%) 
Become Fair as unfair allocation exhibits 
higher inequality  
9  (13.2%)  7  (10.3%) 
Become Egoistic as unfair allocation 
exhibits higher inequality 
1  (1.5%)  1  (1.5%) 
Rest  21  (30.9%)  19  (27.9%) 
Mean pseudo- R
2 (Rest)  0.12  0.10 
Mean pseudo- R
2 (All Subjects)  0.73  0.74 
 
Note: Mean pseudo- R
2 (Rest) denotes the mean of pseudo- R
2s obtained from individual Probit estimations on the subject 
level  of  those  that  do  not  have  a  consistent  strategy.  To  calculate  Mean  pseudo-  R
2 ( A l l  S u b j e c t s )  t h e  R
2 o f  s u b j e c t s  
exhibiting a consistent strategy were set to 1. 
According to this measure 70.6 percent of the individuals in the high-load condition 
and 67.1 percent in the low-load condition behave consistent with Bolton Ockenfels utility 
functions.  Thus,  there  are  almost  no  differences  in o u r  c o n s i s t e n c y  m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  t w o  
treatment  groups.  The  largest  fraction  consists  of  individuals,  who  never  choose  the  fair 
allocation in the 16 games with an equal or almost-equal split. As table 3 reveals "never-fair" 
makes up a larger fraction (48.5 percent) in the low-load condition compared to the high-load 
condition (41.8 percent). In the high-load condition by contrast a considerable larger amount 
of subjects always choose the fair allocation (17.9 percent) compared to (5.9 percent) in the 
low-load condition.
10 To get a measure for consistency of the remaining subjects we estimated 
individual probit-regressions. This was done by regressing the individual's 20 choices on the 
extent  of  inequality  (that  is,  the  dictator’s  share)  of  the  unfair  allocation.  The  resulting 
individual pseudo- gives an indicator of consistency. There are only minor differences in 
the two means of the pseudo- (see table 3) of the subjects, who do not exhibit a consistent 
pattern.  A  Wilcoxon  Ranks  Signed  test  reveals  that  they  are  not  significantly  different 
(p=0.85). This suggests that individuals in the high-load condition exhibit behavior that is as 
consistent as in the low-load condition. Therefore, the finding that high-load subjects are more 
generous is unlikely to reflect a higher degree of randomness in subjects' choices. Our result 
rather shows that a higher fraction of high-load subjects always chooses the fair allocation, 
whereas low-load subjects are more likely to never choose the fair allocation. 
                                                           
10 As we randomized the appearance of the fair and advantageous allocations (up or down), always choosing the fair or 
advantageous allocation does not constitute an easy heuristic like "always choose the upper allocation". 15 
 
Conclusion 
The role of affect and emotions in social dilemmas has received increasing attention in 
economics (see e.g. Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein, 2000; Elster, 1998). Utilizing 
a dual task technique we find that individual's choices are more generous when taken under 
high cognitive load. This finding underscores the importance of affect in the decision process. 
Our evidence suggests that the affective system steers behavior towards altruistic choice. This 
finding conforms with the studies by Kogut and Ritov (2005) and Small, Loewenstein, and 
Slovic (2007), who find that subjects exhibit a higher willingness to donate to identifiable 
victims. They attribute these to the role of affect and emotions. In fact, Small et al. (2007) 
show that inducing people to deliberate about the discrepancy in giving towards identifiable 
and statistical victims, results in an overall reduction in donations. 
We find no indication for an equality heuristic in our experiment. Individuals are just 
as likely to choose an equal split or an almost-equal split. Thus, in our study the affective 
system more generally steers towards altruistic behavior and this is not reflected by the focal 
point of an exact equal split.  
Our  study  supports  the  notion  that  basic  social  preferences  are  fundamental:  the 
affective system, associated with evolutionary older parts of the brain, mediates decisions 
towards altruistic choice. This suggests that basic morality is an (older) product of evolution 
and not just a "thin layer of civilization covering the wild animal within". While evolutionary 
theory posits a selfish gene (Dawkins, 1976) that does not lead as a consequence to selfish 
behavior.  Kin-selection  (Hamilton,  1964),  reciprocity  (Trivers,  1971),  indirect  reciprocity 
(Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), costly signaling (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 
2001)  and  gene-culture  coevolution  (Gintis,  2003)  can  explain  cooperative  behavior. 
Affective  reaction  might  be  an  important  proximal  mechanism  to  support  cooperative 
behavior in these instances. 
Further, our experiment highlights the importance of the deliberate system. In the low-
load condition individuals react stronger to incentives posed by differences in the inequality 
of the different games. Thus, while the deliberate system adjusts behavior in a self-serving 
manner, it also moderates the immediate affective reaction in a way that is more tailored to 
the situation at hand. For example, in the case that the unfair allocation does not leave any 
points  for  the  other  person,  the  low-load  subjects  are  just  as  likely  to  choose  the  fair 
allocation.  In  our  non-strategic  experiment  subjects  were  confronted  with  rather 
straightforward social dilemmas. How our results extend to more complex moral settings or 16 
 
situations that trigger emotions like anger or envy mig ht be a worthwhile area for future 
research.  17 
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Appendix - Instructions 
General Instructions 
 
Today you are participating in an economic experiment. By carefully reading the following 
instructions, you can - depending on your decisions - earn money in addition to the show-up 
fee  of  2  Euro.  It  is,  therefore,  of  importance  that  you  accurately r e a d  t h e s e  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
During  the  whole  experiment  it  is  not  allowed  to  communicate  with  other  participants. 
Therefore, we ask you to not speak with each other. If you do not understand something, 
please consult the instructions again. If you still have questions, please rise your hand. We 
will come to your place and answer your question individually.   
During the experiment we do not speak of Euro, but points. The points you earn during the 
experiment will be converted at the following rate:  
1 point = €  0,22 
The show-up fee of 2 Euro and the total amount of points you earned will be converted into 
Euro and paid out to you in cash at the end of today's experiment. 
On the following pages we  explain the course  of the experiment in detail. First, we will 
familiarize  you  with  the  basic  decision  situation.   W h e n  y o u  a r e  f i n i s h e d  r e a d i n g  t h e  
instruction, you will find control questions on your screen. They are intended to help you 
understand the setting. The experiment only begins, when every participant is familiarized 
with the course of the experiment. 
The experiment involves two types of participants: participant A and participant B. Participant 
A takes several decisions. Participant B makes no decision. Each participant takes on the role 
of a participant A and the role of a participant B. At the end of the experiment it will be 
randomly determined whether you will be paid out as a participant A or a participant B. At no 
point in time you will be informed about the identity of another participant. Likewise, the 
other participants will not be informed about your identity. Thus, all payments will be made 
anonymous.  That  is,  the  other  participants  do  not  learn,  how  much  you  earned  in  the 
experiment.  
 




The experiment consists of two different tasks. The first task is a listening-task.  Here you can 
earn points by responding in a correct manner to letters you hear over the headphones. The 
second task consists of a sequence of 20 decision situations. In each decision situation you 
decide on the distribution of an amount of money between you and participant B. 
 
Listening-task 
In the listening-task you hear letters over your headphones. Every three seconds you hear the 
next letter. Your task is to press the key 'a' whenever a letter resounds that sounded 2 letters 
before.  
Assume, for example, you hear the following sequence of letters: Q, L, S, L, P, Q, P … When 
you hear one of the underlined letters, you should indicate that by pressing the key 'a'. 
 
 
Every time you correctly identify a letter that sounded two letters before you earn 0.5 points. 
To press the 'a' key you have time until the next letter sounds (3 seconds). If you press 'a', 
even though the letter did not sound two letters before, 0.25 points are deducted.  
Before the experiment starts, there will be a test-trial of two minutes so you can familiarize 
yourself with the task. The test trial lasts 90 sec. In this test-trial there are no points to be 
earned. If you have any question after the test-trial please do not hesitate to direct them to us 




There are 20 decision-tasks. Your task is to decide on one out of two possible allocations. By 
deciding on one allocation, you decide how an amount is divided between you and another 
participant. 
  
Q  L  S  L  P  … 
Press 'a' 23 
 
Display on the Screen 
 
 
Instead of A1, B1, A2 and B2 you will find numbers, which correspond to the payments to A 
and B. You make your choice by clicking with the left mouse button on one of the two (light-
blue) allocations. You have the choice between (A1, B1) and (A2, B2). If, for example, you 
choose (A1 B1), you propose an assignment of points in such a way that you get A1 points 
and participant B gets B1 points. (The left number will always refer to the number of points 
for you and the right number refers to the number of points to participant B). The allocation 
you have chosen will be highlighted with a blue rectangle. Participant B does not make a 
decision. 
 You  have  20  seconds  to  make  your  choice.  Within  the  20  seconds  you  still  have  the 
opportunity to change your mind. After 20 seconds the highlighted allocation is taken as your 
choice.  If  you  fail  to  make  a  choice  in  the  given  time, 1 point of  your earnings will be 
deducted. How many seconds are left for your decision is shown on the screen. The number 







No. of decision situation (Here: No. 5 out of 20)  Seconds, until time for decision elapses 
The two allocations you can choose from. Here 
allocation (A2, B2) has been choosen. 
 A1    B1 
 A2    B2 24 
 
Sequence of the experiment 
 
After you have read the instructions there will be a test-trial of the listening-task (90 sec.). 
During the test-trial you cannot earn any points. There will be also control questions with 
regard to the decision situations. Please do not hesitate to direct any question to us.  
The study starts with the listening-task. The listening-task will continue throughout the study. 
For every correct hit you earn 0.5 points, while for every wrong hit 0.25 points are deducted. 
You get to know the amount of points only at the end of the study.  
Shortly  after  the  listening-task  has  started,  the  sequence  of  20  decision  situations  begins 
parallel  to  it.  In  each  decision  situation  you  have 2 0  s e c o n d s  t o  d e c i d e .  B e f o r e  t h e  n e x t  
decision situation starts, there is a seven seconds break. In each decision problem you are 
randomly rematched with a participant B.  
 
Payment 
At the end of the study  you will be informed on the amount of points y ou get from the 
listening-task and the decision situations (as participant A and participant B). Your payment 
consists of your show-up fee (2 € ), plus the amount of points from the decision situation and 
the listening task. At the end of the experiment it will be randomly determined which decision 
situation will be paid out. Further, it will be randomly determined whether you will be paid 




Before we begin with the experiment please answer a few questions on the computer screen. 
These control questions do not influence your payments at the end of the experiment. First, 
there will be questions regarding the decision situations. When all participants have solved 
these questions, there will be the subsequent trial of the listening-task (90 sec.).  
 
 
     
20 s   
7 s  
20 s  
7 s  
20 s  
    …  
20 s  
7 s  
20 s  
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